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Abstract
We examine a situation that n eavesdroppers attack the Bennett-Brassard cryptographic pro-
tocol via their own optimal and symmetric strategies. Information gain and mutual information
with sender for each eavesdropper are explicitly derived. The receiver’s error rate for the case of
arbitrary n eavesdroppers can be derived using a recursive relation. Although first eavesdropper
can get mutual information without disturbance arising due to other eavesdroppers, subsequent
eavesdropping generally increases the receiver’s error rate. Other eavesdroppers cannot gain in-
formation on the input signal sufficiently. As a result, the information each eavesdropper gains
becomes less than optimal one.
1
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography is one of the major applications of quantum information
theories[1, 2] While other applications such as quantum teleportation and quantum com-
puter require tens or even thousands of qubits, the quantum cryptography scenario such as
BB84 protocol[3] can be implemented, at least theoretically, using only single qubit tech-
nology. This is main reason why the quantum cryptography based on BB84 or Ekert91[4] is
now at the stage of the industrial era[5].
According to the usual BB84 protocol the sender (Alice) sends a single qubit to the
receiver (Bob) by choosing randomly one of the conjugate bases {|x〉, |y〉} and {|u〉, |v〉},
where
|u〉 = 1√
2
(|x〉+ |y〉) |v〉 = 1√
2
(|x〉 − |y〉) . (1.1)
Then Bob performs a quantum mechanical measurements in these bases. After measure-
ments, Alice and Bob communicate with each other via classical public channel and establish
a secret quantum key by using only those cases in which the bases of Alice and Bob coincide.
How much information an eavesdropper (Eve) can gain when Alice and Bob perform the
usual BB84 scheme? The answer of this question is important to check the security of the
quantum cryptography. In this reason many authors examined the various strategies with
one- and two-dimensional probes[6, 7, 8, 9]. Among them Ref.[9] derived the optimal (or
maximal) mutual information between Alice and Eve as a function of the disturbance D in
the BB84 protocol. The final result can be summarized as follows:
Ixy = 1
2
φ
[
2
√
Duv(1−Duv)
]
Iuv = 1
2
φ
[
2
√
Dxy(1−Dxy)
]
, (1.2)
where Ixy (or Iuv) is the optimal mutual information when Alice sends a signal to Bob via
x− y (or u− v) basis, and φ(z) = (1+ z) log2(1+ z)+ (1− z) log2(1− z). The constants Dxy
and Duv denote the disturbances in these bases. The most different point of the quantum
cryptography from the classical one is the fact that Eve cannot get information from the
trusted parties without arising the disturbance. This implies that the quantum scheme is
more secure than the classical cryptography.
Recently, many different cryptographic protocols have been studied from the purely the-
oretical ground (at least at current stage) even if most quantum cryptography has been
demonstrated by making use of either one of BB84 or Ekert91 protocols. One of the moti-
2
0.00 0.25 0.50
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
 
 
M
ut
ua
l I
nf
or
m
at
io
n
Fig. 1
2-bases 3-bases
d=3
d=5
Disturbance
d=4
FIG. 1: Plot of D-dependence of the optimal mutual information when Alice and Bob use the
various different protocols.
vations for searching other protocols is to strength the security against eavesdropping. The
simple extended protocol is a six-state protocol[10, 11]. In this protocol Alice sends a sig-
nal to Bob after choosing randomly one of three conjugate bases {|x〉, |y〉}, {|u〉, |v〉} and
{|w〉, |z〉}, where
|w〉 = 1√
2
(|x〉+ i|y〉) |z〉 = 1√
2
(|x〉 − i|y〉) . (1.3)
The basis {|w〉, |z〉} corresponds to the circular polarization if Alice and Bob use a photon
polarization as a qubit. The optimal mutual information between Alice and Eve is plotted in
Fig. 1, which implies that the six-state protocol is more secure than usual four-state BB84
against eavesdropping. Another extended protocol[12, 13, 14, 15] is that Alice and Bob use
qutrit (d = 3) or more generally qudit (d = 4, 5, · · · ) instead of a qubit. The optimal mutual
information in this protocol is also plotted in Fig. 1 when d = 3, 4, and 5. Fig. 1 indicates
that the protocol with d-level system is more secure against eavesdropping with increasing d.
Furthermore, the quantum cryptography with continuum[16] and noisy states[17] are under
investigation. However, all of these other protocols seem to be far from embodiment in a
few years from the aspect of experimental science.
In this paper we would like to explore the situation where many eavesdroppers (Eve1,
3
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FIG. 2: Quantum circuit expression for the optimal eavesdropping strategy. Fig. 2(a) and (b)
represent the optimal strategy when Alice sends a signal using x − y or u − v basis respectively.
The bottom two lines belong to Eve and the top line to Alice. Time advances from left to right.
Eve2, · · · ) attack the BB84 protocol optimally. We assume that all of the eavesdroppers
think they are unique eavesdropper. Our computation is based on the quantum circuit ex-
pression of the optimal eavesdropping strategy[18]. This paper is organized as follows. In
section II we review Ref.[18] briefly. In this section we develop a computational technique,
which is useful when many eavesdroppers try to attack optimally. In section III we examine
the situation where Eve1 and Eve 2 attack the usual BB84 protocol. Information gain G(i)
and mutual information I(i) are explicitly computed, where i = 1 or 2 corresponds to Eve1
and Eve2 respectively. When Eve1 and Eve2 attack via symmetric optimal strategy, we com-
pute the Bob’s error rate or disturbance DB,2 explicitly, where the subscript “2” denotes the
two eavesdroppers. It turns out that both optimal strategies fail. Although Eve1 can gain
information on Alice’s signal as much as possible, Eve2 increases the disturbance or Bob’s
error rate. For Eve2 she cannot gain information sufficiently due to Eve1’s disturbance.
In section IV we examine the situation where three eavesdroppers attack the BB84 proto-
col. The mutual information for each eavesdropper is analytically derived. Furthermore,
Bob’s error rate DB,3 is also explicitly derived on condition that all eavesdroppers use the
symmetric strategies. In section V we have generalized the results of the previous sections.
When n eavesdroppers attack, the mutual information for each eavesdropper is analytically
derived. Also the recursive relation of the Bob’s error rate is derived. It turns out that
all optimal strategies eavesdroppers choose eventually fail except very rare cases. Finally a
brief concluding remark is given.
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II. ONE EAVESDROPPER
The quantum circuits for the optimal eavesdropping in x − y and u − v bases are given
in Fig. 2. The top line belongs to Alice and Bob, and the bottom two lines to Eve. In order
to perform the optimal eavesdropping strategy Eve prepares the initial states as following:
|e0〉 =
√
1−∆uv|x〉+
√
∆uv|y〉 =
√
1−Duv|u〉+
√
Duv|v〉 (2.1)
|f0〉 =
√
1−Dxy|x〉+
√
Dxy|y〉 =
√
1−∆xy|u〉+
√
∆xy|v〉
where ∆ and D are related, when they have same subscripts, through the formula
∆ =
1
2
−
√
D(1−D) D = 1
2
−
√
∆(1 −∆). (2.2)
If Alice sends a signal using x−y basis, Fig. 2(a) shows that the entangled states between
Alice and Eve becomes
|x〉 → |X〉 = α0|xxx〉 + α1|yxy〉+ α2|xyx〉+ α3|yyy〉 (2.3)
|y〉 → |Y 〉 = α0|yyx〉+ α1|xyy〉+ α2|yxx〉+ α3|xxy〉
where
α0 =
√
1−∆uv
√
1−Dxy α1 =
√
1−∆uv
√
Dxy (2.4)
α2 =
√
∆uv
√
1−Dxy α3 =
√
∆uv
√
∆xy.
For later use it is necessary to express Eq.(2.3) more compactly. This can be achieved by
|X〉 =
3∑
i=0
αi|i〉2|i〉4 |Y 〉 =
3∑
i=0
αi|i+ 1〉2|i+ 2〉4 (2.5)
where |j〉2 and |j〉4 means |j modulo 2〉 and |j modulo 4〉. Thus |j〉2 and |j〉4 represents
the one- and two-qubit states respectively with ordering x and y for |j〉2 and xx, xy, yx and
yy for |j〉4. This compact notation will be usefully used in the following sections when many
eavesdroppers attack.
When Alice sends a signal using u− v basis, the usual control-NOT gate changes
|uu〉 → |uu〉 |uv〉 → |vv〉 |vu〉 → |vu〉 |vv〉 → |uv〉. (2.6)
Thus the control-NOT gate in x − y basis can be easily understood in u − v basis by
exchanging the control gate with target gate. This is a reason why Fig. 2(b) used in u − v
basis is different from Fig. 2(a).
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Now, we want to show that the entangled states (2.3) with suitable POVM measurement
enables Eve to get information optimally. The complete set of the positive operators, which
is used for POVM, can be derived generally as projective operators onto the eigenvectors of
Γxy = ρx − ρy, where[19]
ρx = TrAlice|X〉〈X| ρy = TrAlice|Y 〉〈Y |. (2.7)
For our case the complete set of the positive operators is {E0, E1, E2, E3} with E0 = |xx〉〈xx|,
E1 = |xy〉〈xy|, E2 = |yx〉〈yx|, and E3 = |yy〉〈yy|. Then it is easy to compute Pλi =
〈I|1 ⊗ Eλ|I〉 with I = X or Y and i = x or y, which is the probability that Eve detects
outcome λ when Alice sends a signal i:
P0x = α
2
0 P1x = α
2
1 P2x = α
2
2 P3x = α
2
3 (2.8)
P0y = α
2
2 P1y = α
2
3 P2y = α
2
0 P3y = α
2
1.
Using Eq.(2.8), one can compute qλ = (1/2)(Pλx + Pλy) and Qiλ = (1/2)Pλi/qλ:
q0 =
1
2
(1−Dxy) q1 = 1
2
Dxy q2 =
1
2
(1−Dxy) q3 = 1
2
Dxy (2.9)
and
Qx0 = 1−∆uv Qx1 = 1−∆uv Qx2 = ∆uv Qx3 = ∆uv (2.10)
Qy0 = ∆uv Qy1 = ∆uv Qy2 = 1−∆uv Qy3 = 1−∆uv.
The quantity qλ is a probability that Eve has outcome λ when Alice uses x − y basis. The
quantity Qiλ is posterior probability on the Eve’s guess after she has a outcome λ. Then
the information gain is defined as Gλ = |Qxλ −Qyλ|, which, for our case, is λ-independent:
Gλ = 1− 2∆uv = 2
√
Duv(1−Duv). (2.11)
Thus, the mutual information IAE between Alice and Eve reduces to
IAE ≡ 1
2
∑
λ
qλφ(Gλ) =
1
2
φ [2Duv(1−Duv)] (2.12)
where φ(z) = (1 + z) log2(1 + z) + (1− z) log2(1− z).
Now, let us derive the Bob’s error rate, usually called disturbance when Alice sends a
signal using the x− y basis. First, we consider the following quantities:
dλu ≡ 1− 〈U |Bu ⊗Eλ|U〉〈U |1 ⊗ Eλ|U〉 dλv ≡ 1−
〈V |Bv ⊗ Eλ|V 〉
〈V |1 ⊗Eλ|V 〉 (2.13)
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where |U〉 = (1/√2)(|X〉 + |Y 〉), |V 〉 = (1/√2)(|X〉 − |Y 〉), Bu = |u〉〈u|, and Bv = |v〉〈v|.
These are probabilities Bob gets a wrong result conditioned upon Alice sending |u〉 or |v〉,
and Eve measuring λ. Computation of dλu and dλv is straightforward. The result is that
dλu is identical to dλv and they are also λ-independent as follows:
dλu = dλv ≡ dλ = Duv. (λ = 0, 1, 2, 3) (2.14)
Then the Bob’s error rate DB is given by
DB ≡
∑
λ
qλdλ = Duv. (2.15)
Thus Eq.(2.12) can be re-written as
IAE = 1
2
φ [2DB(1−DB)] (2.16)
which is the optimal mutual information derived in Ref.[9] when Alice sends a signal using
x − y basis. If Alice uses u − v basis, we should repeat the previous calculation using Fig.
2(b). The final result is identical with Eq.(2.16) except DB = Dxy. Thus, the strategies
expressed by Fig. 2 give an optimal information to Eve regardless of the basis Alice is using.
III. TWO EAVESDROPPERS
Now we consider a situation that two eavesdroppers, Eve1 and Eve2, attack the usual
BB84 protocol. We assume that Eve1 and Eve2 do not know each other and they use their
own optimal strategies. Thus corresponding quantum circuit should be Fig. 3 when Alice
sends a signal using x− y basis. From now on we will use the superscript (i) to distinguish
the quantities (or states) which belong to Eve1 and Eve2.
Using the compact notation used in Eq.(2.5), one can derive the entangled states at the
stage represented as a dotted line in Fig. 3:
|x〉 → |X〉 =
3∑
i,j=0
α
(1)
i α
(2)
j |i+ j〉2|i〉4|2i+ j〉4 (3.1)
|y〉 → |Y 〉 =
3∑
i,j=0
α
(1)
i α
(2)
j |i+ j + 1〉2|i+ 2〉4|2i+ j + 2〉4.
In order to derive the POVM elements for Eve1 we construct the operator
Γ(1)xy = ρ
(1)
x − ρ(1)y (3.2)
7
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FIG. 3: Quantum circuit expression for the situation where two eavesdroppers Eve1 and Eve2
attack the usual BB84 protocol when Alice sends a signal to Bob using x− y basis. The top line
belongs to Alice, next two lines to Eve1, and bottom two lines to Eve2. If Alice uses a u− v basis,
this figure should be modified by exchanging the control gates with target gates in all control-NOT
gates. Time advances from left to right.
where
ρ(1)x = TrA,E2|X〉〈X| ρ(1)y = TrA,E2|Y 〉〈Y |. (3.3)
In Eq.(3.3) TrA,E2 means a partial trace over Alice and Eve2’s qubits. Then it is easy to
compute the eigenvectors of Γ
(1)
xy , which gives the complete set of the positive operators
{E(1)0 , E(1)1 , E(1)2 , E(1)3 } to Eve1, where
E
(1)
0 = |xx〉2,3〈xx| E(1)1 = |xy〉2,3〈xy| E(1)2 = |yx〉2,3〈yx| E(1)3 = |yy〉2,3〈yy|. (3.4)
The subscript 2, 3 means qubits of second and third lines in Fig. 3. By same way one can
construct the complete set of the positive operators for Eve2, which is
E
(2)
0 = |xx〉4,5〈xx| E(2)1 = |xy〉4,5〈xy| E(2)2 = |yx〉4,5〈yx| E(2)3 = |yy〉4,5〈yy|. (3.5)
Then the remaining calculation for the mutual informations IAE1 between Alice and Eve1,
and IAE2 between Alice and Eve2 is straightforward. The information gains G(1)λ for Eve1
and G
(2)
λ for Eve2 turn out to be λ-independent as following:
G
(1)
λ = 1− 2∆(1)uv G(2)λ = (1− 2∆(2)uv )(1− 2D(1)xy ). (λ = 0, 1, 2, 3) (3.6)
Therefore from a comparison of Eq.(3.6) with Eq.(2.11) Eve1 seems to be able to get in-
formation as much as the case of unique eavesdropper. This is due to the fact that Eve1
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attacks the BB84 protocol earlier than Eve2 and therefore, gathers information without per-
turbation arising due to Eve2. However, this does not mean that Eve1’s optimal strategy is
succeeded. As shown in Fig. 1 optimality of the eavesdropping does not uniquely depend
on the quantity of information that eavesdropper can gain. In order to get success in the
eavesdropping, eavesdropper should decrease the disturbance as much as possible. These
two factors, increase of information gain and decrease of disturbance, determine the success
or failure of the optimal strategy. As will be shown shortly, Eve1’s optimal strategy fails be-
cause Eve2 increases Bob’s error rate. For Eve2 the information gain involves an interesting
factor 1 − D(1)xy . Thus Eve2’s information gain depends on the Eve1’s choice of D(1)xy . This
is manifestly due to the fact that Eve2 performs her optimal strategy after Eve1. If Eve1
chooses D
(1)
xy = 0, Eve2 can get information as much as Eve1 if ∆
(1)
uv = ∆
(2)
uv . This indicates
that Eve2 can increase her information gain if Eve1 does not disturb the signal Alice sent
to Bob. The mutual information IAE1 and IAE2 reduce to
IAE1 = 1
2
φ
(
G
(1)
λ
)
IAE2 = 1
2
φ
(
G
(2)
λ
)
. (3.7)
Now, let us turn into the Bob’s error rate. Unlike the unique eavesdropper case discussed
in the previous section the situation is very complicated. In this case it could happen that
Eve1’s disturbance and Eve2’s successive disturbance does not generate an error to Bob.
Thus equation corresponding to Eq.(2.13) in previous section should have one more index,
i.e. dλu → dλλ′u and dλv → dλλ′v. Since, furthermore, both optimal strategies Eve1 and Eve2
have chosen do not get success, we expect to have dλλ′u 6= dλλ′v. Thus we should compute
the Bob’s error rate separately when Alice sends |u〉 and |v〉. Since computation in this way
needs long and tedious calculation, we will try to make the situation more simple.
To make the situation more simple we assume that both eavesdropping strategies are
symmetric, i.e. D
(1)
xy = D
(1)
uv and D
(2)
xy = D
(2)
uv . In this case we can compute the Bob’s error
rate directly from the entangled states Eq. (3.1), which is
DB = D
(1)(1−D(2)) +D(2)(1−D(1)). (3.8)
In Eq.(3.8) we omit the subscript because it is useless in the symmetric strategies. If D(2) =
0, DB becomes D
(1) which is Bob’s error rate if Eve1 is an unique eavesdropper. If D(1) = 0,
DB becomes D
(2) which is also Bob’s error rate if Eve2 is an unique eavesdropper. The
general Bob’s error rate becomes nice combination of D(1) and D(2).
9
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FIG. 4: Plot of DB-dependence of IAE1 (Fig. 4(a)) and IAE2 (Fig. 4(b)). The dotted line is
a DB-dependence of the optimal strategy derived in Eq.(1.2). The monotonically decreasing line
corresponds to IAB, mutual information between Alice and Bob. Fig. 4(a) implies that the mutual
information of Eve1 is less than the optimal one except D(2) = 0. This is due to the fact that
Eve2’s eavesdropping process generally increases the Bob’s error rate. Fig. 4(b) implies that the
mutual information of Eve2 is also less than the optimal one except D(1) = 0. This is due to the
fact that Eve1’s eavesdropping process generally decreases the information gain for Eve1.
Fig. 4 is DB-dependence of IAE1 (Fig. 4(a)) and IAE2 (Fig. 4(b)). We plot IAE1 in
Fig. 4(a) when D(2) = 0.1, 0.2 and 0.3 respectively. For comparison we plot the optimal
information Iopt (see Eq.(1.2)) and mutual information IAB between Alice and Bob defined
IAB = 1 +DB log2DB + (1−DB) log2(1−DB) (3.9)
together. As Fig. 4(a) indicates, Eve1’s mutual information with Alice are in general smaller
than Iopt when D(2) 6= 0. If D(2) approaches to zero, IAE1 approaches to Iopt. This means
that failure of the Eve1’s optimal strategy is only due to the fact that Eve2 increases the
disturbance. We plot IAE2 in Fig. 4(b) when D(1) = 0.1, 0.2 and 0.3 respectively. For
comparison we plot Iopt and IAB together. As expected IAE2 approaches to Iopt in the
limit D(1) → 0. In this case, however, IAE2 decreases very rapidly compared to IAE1 with
increasing D(1). This seems to be mainly due to the fact that Eve2’s information gain is
affected by Eve1 as shown in Eq.(3.6).
In Fig. 5 we plot IAE1 and IAE2 together as functions of D(1) and D(2). In most region
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FIG. 5: The D(1)- and D(2)-dependence of IAE1 and IAE2 . In most region IAE1 is larger than
IAE2 . This seems to be mainly due to the factor 1−D(1)xy in Eq.(3.6). However, in the small D(1)
region IAE2 becomes larger than IAE1 because this multiplication factor becomes nearly unit in
this region.
IAE1 is larger than IAE2 . This is also due to the D(1)-dependence of Eve2’s information gain
G
(2)
λ . In the small D
(1) region, however, IAE2 becomes larger than IAE1 . This is due to the
fact that Eve1 cannot gain information without increasing D(1) as Eq.(3.6) indicates.
IV. THREE EAVESDROPPERS
In this section we consider a situation that three eavesdroppers called Eve1, Eve2, and
Eve3 attack the usual BB84 protocol. As previous section we assume that they think they
are unique eavesdroppers and choose their own symmetric strategies. Thus corresponding
quantum circuit should be Fig. 6 when Alice sends a signal using x− y basis.
Using the compact notation used in Eq.(2.5), one can derive the entangled states at the
11
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FIG. 6: Quantum circuit expression for the situation where three eavesdroppers Eve1, Eve2, and
Eve3 attack the usual BB84 protocol when Alice sends a signal to Bob using x− y basis. The top
line belongs to Alice, next two lines to Eve1, next two lines to Eve2 and bottom two lines to Eve3.
Time advances from left to right.
stage represented as a dotted line in Fig. 6. The final result becomes
|x〉 → |X〉 =
3∑
i,j,k=0
α
(1)
i α
(2)
j α
(3)
k |i+ j + k〉2|i〉4|2i+ j〉4|2i+ 2j + k〉4 (4.1)
|y〉 → |Y 〉 =
3∑
i,j,k=0
α
(1)
i α
(2)
j α
(3)
k |i+ j + k + 1〉2|i+ 2〉4|2i+ j + 2〉4|2i+ 2j + k + 2〉4.
Then, it is straightforward to construct the complete sets of the positive operators for
eavesdroppers’ POVM measurements. Following the similar calculational procedure, one can
compute the information gain for each eavesdropper. The final result can be summarized as
following:
G
(1)
λ = 1− 2∆(1) = 2
√
D(1)(1−D(1)) (4.2)
G
(2)
λ = (1− 2∆(2))(1− 2D(1)) = 2(1− 2D(1))
√
D(2)(1−D(2))
G
(3)
λ = (1− 2∆(3))(1− 2D(1))(1− 2D(2)) = 2(1− 2D(1))(1− 2D(2))
√
D(3)(1−D(3)).
Note that we remove all subscripts because they are not necessary in the symmetric strategy.
Eq.(4.2) exhibits a simple pattern: the information gain for each eavesdropper is a multi-
plication of her own 1 − 2∆ factor with 1 − 2D factor of other eavesdroppers who perform
their own strategies earlier. Using this rule, we can compute the information gains when
n eavesdroppers attack with arbitrary number n without explicit calculation. The mutual
12
informations IAE1 , IAE2 and IAE3 reduce to
IAE1 = 1
2
φ
(
G
(1)
λ
)
IAE2 = 1
2
φ
(
G
(2)
λ
)
IAE3 = 1
2
φ
(
G
(3)
λ
)
. (4.3)
Finally Bob’s error rate DB can be read straightforwardly from Eq.(4.1):
DB =
[
D(1)
(
1−D(2))+D(2) (1−D(1))] (1−D(3))+[D(1)D(2) + (1−D(1)) (1−D(2))]D(3).
(4.4)
When D(3) = 0, Eq.(4.4) exactly coincides with Eq.(3.8). If, furthermore, D(1) = 0 or
D(2) = 0, Eq.(4.4) reduces to Eq.(3.8) with changing only Eve index.
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FIG. 7: Plot of DB-dependence of IAE1 (Fig. 7(a)), IAE2 (Fig. 7(b)), and IAE3 (Fig. 7(c)).
The optimal mutual information Iopt and Bob’s mutual information IAB are plotted together for
comparison. This figure indicates that all optimal strategies performed by Eve1, Eve2, and Eve3
turn out fail.
Fig. 7 is the plot of DB-dependence of IAE1 (Fig. 7(a)), IAE2 (Fig. 7(b)), and IAE3
(Fig. 7(c)). We fixed D(2) = D(3) = 0.1, 0.2 and 0.3 in Fig. 7(a), D(1) = D(3) = 0.1, 0.2
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FIG. 8: Schematic diagram for the situation that n eavesdroppers optimally attack the usual BB84
protocol performed by two trusted parties, Alice and Bob. We assume that Alice sends a signal
using x − y basis. If Alice uses u − v basis, this diagram should be modified by exchanging all
control gates with target gates.
and 0.3 in Fig. 7(b), and D(1) = D(2) = 0.1, 0.2 and 0.3 in Fig. 7(c). For comparison
the optimal mutual information Iopt and Bob’s information IAB are plotted together. As
Fig. 7 indicates, all optimal strategies turn out to fail. Especially, Eve3 gains very little
information compared to optimal one. This is mainly due to the fact that Eve1 and Eve2
disturb the Alice’s signal before Eve3 starts her optimal strategy. Comparision of Fig. 7
with Fig. 4 indicates that mutual informations in the case of three eavesdroppers are overall
less than those in the case of two eavesdroppers. This seems to be due to the fact that
Eve3’s disturbance of Alice’s signal decreases IAE1 and IAE2 in the disturbance-information
diagram.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have examined the situation that many eavesdroppers attack usual
BB84 protocol via their own symmetric optimal strategies. If the number of eavesdroppers
is arbitrarily n as shown in Fig. 8, Eq.(2.11), (3.6) and (4.2) imply that their information
gains are
G(j) =
(
1− 2∆(j)) (1− 2D(1)) · · · (1− 2D(j−1)) (j = 1, · · · , n) (5.1)
and their mutual informations with Alice are
I(j) = 1
2
φ
(
G(j)
)
. (j = 1, · · · , n) (5.2)
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Furthermore, Eq.(2.15), (3.8) and (4.4) imply that Bob’s error rate in the presence of n
eavesdroppers can be computed as follows. In order to distinguish the number of eaves-
droppers in the Bob’s error rate, we use one more index such as DB,j , which is Bob’s error
rate when j eavesdroppers attack with symmetric optimal strategies. Then DB,n can be
computed from DB,n−1 by a recursion relation
DB,n = DB,n−1
(
1−D(n))+DB,n−1
∣∣∣∣
D(n−1)→1−D(n−1)
D(n). (5.3)
Since we know DB,1 exactly, one can compute DB,n recursively.
Eq.(5.2) and (5.3) enable us to plot the disturbance-information diagram for any eaves-
droppers. As commented already in the previous sections, all eavesdroppers’ optimal strate-
gies cannot succeed eventually except very rare cases. Although the first eavesdropper can
obtain mutual information without disturbance arisen due to the other eavesdroppers, sub-
sequent eavesdroppers increase the Bob’s error rate. This makes the mutual information of
the first eavesdropper lower than the optimal one in the disturbance-information diagram
except D(2) = · · · = D(n) = 0. The last eavesdropper cannot gain information due to the
disturbance of the Alice’s signal arising due to the previous eavesdroppings. Thus the last
eavesdropper’s optimal strategy fails except D(1) = · · · = D(n−1) = 0. Similar reasons make
all optimal strategies fail.
It seems to be of interest to extend our results to the case of asymmetric eavesdropping.
Probably it needs very long and tedious calculation. Furthermore, asymmetric eavesdropping
strategy may be not important practically because Alice and Bob can notice the presence
of eavesdropper more easily than the symmetric case. However, from the purely theoretical
point of view it is interesting issue because it may give origin of information gain and Bob’s
error rate.
Although much attention has been paid to the optimal strategy in the various protocol,
the properties of the non-optimal case are not examined sufficiently. Since, however, the
effect of decoherence makes it impossible for eavesdropper to perform the exactly optimal
one, it seems to be more important to explore the strategies near to optimal from the aspect
of the practical reason. Recently, it is found[20] that the quantum resonance occurs in the
Bob’s error rate when Eve takes a near-optimal strategy. We believe that there are other
new and interesting properties in the eavesdropping strategies near to optimal one. We
would like to explore this issue in the future.
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